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RECENT LEGISLATION
]. Rodney Johnson"'
The 1972 session of the General Assembly was especially active in the
areas of wills, trusts, and estates. Much of this legislation deals with fine
points not affecting the average lawyer in his practice. However, the following items of legislation should be of general interest to the attorney whose
practice involves probate work or estate planning, even though he does not
hold himself out as a specialist in these areas.
THE DISCLAIMER ACT
First, one should note a very valuable post-mortem estate planning tool
now available-the Disclaimer Act, which will appear as Sections 64.1-188
through 64.1-196 of the Code. Though this act is technical, mastery of it
will not require an inordinate amount of time, and potential benefits can
accrue in the form of substantial gift tax savings. Although the federal
estate and gift taxes are excise taxes imposed on the transfer of property,
one can now, in certain cases, make what for all practical purposes is a
transfer of property but which will not be construed as a "transfer" for
federal estate or gift tax purposes. The key language, found in Internal
Revenue Regulation 25.2511-l(c), provides:
[w]here the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate
gives a beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of property transferred from
a decedent, a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the
making of a gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time.
Presently, the law in every state permits a beneficiary under a will to renounce his gift. However, the common law did not recognize the possibility
of renouncing an intestate share in a decedent's estate, since the inheritanc~
was seen to vest by operation of law immediately upon the death of tht?
ancestor. Thus a purported "renunciation" would take effect as a transfer
from the one renouncing to the ultimate taker. While this two-stage transfe~
has caused no real problems in the actual passage of the property, it has
resulted in the payment of an extra tax. This problem is now a matter of
•The Review acknowledges this contribution of Professor J. Rodney Johnson. Professor Johnson also has an article on the abolition of dower in the Articles section of
this issue. The comments here are taken from the text of Professor Johnson's presentation on Law Day 1972.
[ 171]

172

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:171

history because the Act provides for· renunciation of testate, intestate, and
inter vivos gifts.
How can one make practical use of the Disclaimer Act? First, one should
note that the Act takes the lapse approach, treating a disclaimer as if the
disc;:laimant.had predeceased the decedent. Thus,.in cases of intestacy the
ultimate takers will be determined by general intestate succession law, Code.
§ 64.1-1. In testate cases, one would look first to any controlling provision
in the will, then the anti-lapse statute, Code § 64.1-65, then the residuary
clause, and finally back to Code§ 64.1-1.
Case 1. Suppose a beneficiary decides that he has no need for a bequest
and gives it to his children. He has made a taxable gift, and should he die
within three years thereafter it will be presumed to have been a gift in contemplation of death, includible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes
unless ·the presumption can be rebutted. If, instead of accepting the bequest
and giving it to his children, he disclaims it, the bequest would pass to his
issue as intended with no possible gift or estate tax consequences on his part.
Similarly, if there should be an inheritance instead of a bequest, the disclaimed inheritance would pass to the disclaimant's descendants with no tax
consequences on his part.
Case 2. Suppose that a husband, mindful of his obligation to his wife, and
desiring to aid his alma mater, leaves half of his adjusted gross estate to his
wife outright, gives her a life estate in the other half, and leaves the remainder to the school on her death. The husband's estate will not pay any
tax on the half given outright to the wife because of the marital deduction,
but it will pay a tax in connection with the other half. However, due to
the altered circumstances existing at the time of the husband's death (age of
the wife, §ize of estate, etc.), perhaps the wife does not need the life estate
in the second half. If she disclaims the life estate, then the entire second
half will go to charity and no taxes will be payable by the husband's estate.
Case 3. The husband dies intestate survived by his wife and two adult
children who have no children. Assume that the husband leaves a $300,000
estate equally consisting of realty and personalty, and that his wife is 60
years old at his death. The wife will receive one-third of the personalty and
dower in the realty. This is substantially less than the maximum marital
deduction. However the two adult children can disclaim a part of their
inheritance, which will then pass to the deceased's wife, with a consequent
swelling of the marital deduction and lowering of the tax burden on the
estate by approximately $22,500. Were the estate half this size, the estate
tax savings would remain in excess of $6,500.
While space limitations prevent a discussion of the many possible uses of
this act, one should realize that it permits the personal representative of a
decedent to disclaim, and that it requires that the disclaimer be made within
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ten months. of death (delivery in inter vivas cases), or vesting, if that be
later. Draftsmen of spendthrift trusts should be aware of one caveat. As
the beneficiary of a spendthrift provision expressly has the right to-disclaim,
one must provide for some kind of gift over on disclaiming to pr.event the
spendthrift beneficiary from defeating the intention of the transferor.
UNIFORM GIFT TO MINORS ACT
Many attorneys often provide for contingent trusts in wills when in fact
they do not desire to do so. For instance, assume a young married couple
with several children and an estate of $20,000. They want a typical disposition-all to the surviving spouse then all to the children. What. happens if
both parents die before the children attain the age of majority? Who will
manage the children's property for them? If. no provision has been made,
the court will appoint a guardian, the worst possible manner in most cases
to manage a minor's property. Thus, one has no alternative but to provide
a contingent testamentary· trust for the minor children. While this is
preferable to a guardianship, it can involve annual accountings, filing of
fiduciary tax returns, court approval of termination, possible construction
proceedings, fiduciary bonds, and the unlimited throwback rule of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Although the expense of these incidents isn't grossly
oppressive, relative to a large trust, such fixed expenses can be extremely
burdensome to a small trust, because they consume a disproportionate
amount of the income.
Code § 31-27(d), an addition to the Uniform Gift to Minors Act
(UGMA), gives relief by providing that a testator or settlor may authorize
his fiduciary to make distribution for a minor to a custodian for the minor
under the UGMA. The custodian will have sufficient discretion and flexibility under the UGMA to make whatever distributions are desirable for
the benefit of the children during their minority, and the trust expenses
mentioned above could be eliminated, leaving more funds to be used for the
children's benefit. Appropriately, one should note here that while an infant
attains his majority at age 18 for most purposes, he attains it at 21 for
purposes of the UGMA.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
In drafting a will or trust agreement, one must enumerate certain
powers that he wishes his fiduciary to have. Increasingly, lawyers in Virginia are working with Code § 64.1-57 which provides for the incorporation
by reference of certain powers of fiduciaries into wills or trust instruments.
This section contains nineteen clauses of well-designed boilerplate waiting
for incorporation. Paragraph (p) of this section has been amended by the
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addition of new sub-paragraph ( 4) that empowers the .fiduciary to distribute to a minor under the UGMA. Thus it is possible to use the UGMA
directly as previously mentioned, or indirectly by incorporating the statutory boilerplate that gives the .fiduciary the discretion to make this form of
distribution should he think it advisable.
Code § 64.1-57 has been amended also by the addition of a new paragraph ( c) ( 1) that gives the fiduciary discretion to invest the assets in
mutual funds or investment trusts, and permits him to change investments
from realty to personalty and vice versa.
· A final amendment to Code § 64.1-57, expressly stated to be declaratory
of existing law, provides that the section may be made applicable to decedent's estates as well as trusts.
SELF-PROVING WILL
One familiar incident of probating a will is locating the attesting witnesses and arranging for them to accompany the executor to the clerk's
office to prove the will. This time-consuming and cumbersome ritual can
be avoided now by utilizing Code § 64.1-87.1, which provides for a selfproving will. This section sets out the form of an affidavit that contains the
facts that the witnesses would be required to testify to in court to prove the
will. If the testator acknowledges his will and the witnesses execute this
affidavit, all before an official authorized to administer oaths, either at the
time the will is executed or later, then the witnesses' statement "shall be
accepted by the court as if it had been taken ore tenus before such court."
TOTIEN TRUSTS
Code § 6.1-73, a new section, authorizes any bank or trust company to
pay out deposits made in trust form to the named beneficiary on the death
of the trustee, without the intervention of a guardian if ( 1) the institution
has no notice of the trust terms, (2) the deposit doesn't exceed $5,000, and
( 3) the beneficiary is 18 years of age or older. Those desiring to place
more than $5,000 in a Totten Trust may utilize the rather obvious expedient
of multiple accounts, or may establish an account in a savings and loan
association, because existing Code § 6.1-149 doesn't contain any maximum
balance limitation.
AGE OF MAJORITY
Code § 1-13.42(b), which best summarizes the net effect of the age of
majority legislation, provides:
[f]or the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth including com-
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mon law, case law and statutory law, unless an exception is specifically
provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age
and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes eighteen years of
age.
As previously noted, twenty-one remains the age of majority for purposes
of the Uniform Gift to Minors Act which contains its own definitions of
"adult" and "minor."

SMALL FUNDS STATUTE
Code§ 6.1-71, authorizing a bank or trust company to pay to the next of
kin the balance a decedent had on hand at his death provided (1) 120 days
have elapsed since the time of death, (2) no qualification is had on the
estate, and (3) the balance in the account is $1,000 or less, has been amended
to increase the amount to $2,500. A corresponding change in Code§ 6.1-153
renders the same result for accounts in savings and loan associations.
MISCELLANEOUS
The filing deadline for the Virginia inheritance tax return is changed
from four to nine months after the decedent's death. Code § 58-166. The
time for payment of inheritance taxes is changed from twelve to nine months
after the decedent's death. Code§ 58-176.
The statement in lieu of settlement of accounts by a personal representative who is the sole distributee or sole beneficiary is enlarged to cover those
cases where there are two personal representatives who are the only distributees or beneficiaries. Code§ 26-20.1.
Stepchildren are now included in Class A for gift tax purposes. Code §
58-219.
Page two of the form required for reporting inventories to the commissioners of accounts, dealing with "other property of the estate of which the
fiduciary has knowledge," has been deleted. Code § 26-12.1.

